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Abstract. From the early days of the information economy, personal data has 
been its most valuable asset. Despite data protection laws, companies trade per-
sonal information and often intrude on the privacy of individuals. As a result, 
consumers feel out of control and lose trust in electronic environments. Tech-
nologists and regulators are struggling to develop solutions that meet business-
es’ demand for more personal information while maintaining privacy. However, 
no promising proposals seem to be in sight. We propose a 3-tier personal in-
formation market model with privacy. In our model, clear roles, rights and obli-
gations for all actors re-establish trust. The ‘relationship space’ enables data 
subjects and visible business partners to build trusting relationships. The ‘ser-
vice space’ supports customer relationships with distributed information pro-
cessing. The ‘rich information space’ enables anonymized information ex-
change. To transition to this model, we show how existing privacy-enhancing 
technologies and legal requirements can be integrated. 
Keywords: informational privacy, personal data markets, privacy regulation 
1 Introduction 
The digital economy is in a deep crisis. From the inception of the digital economy, 
personal information (PI) has emerged as its core asset. PI is “any information relat-
ing to an identified or identifiable natural person” [1]. Abundantly leveraged as a free 
commons, PI is at the core of Internet economics and is considered the motor for 
online innovation. “Personal data is the new oil of the Internet and the new currency 
of the digital world” [2]. It finances the Internet’s free content. It strengthens an Inter-
net company’s competitive stance. In many cases, it is even the only ingredient that 
brings an online service to life (e.g., social networking). 
However, PI is also at the core of three facets that constitute humanity: Identity, 
dignity and privacy. And as PI is increasingly collected, used, packaged, and sold, 
more conflict arises around how people can retain control of their identities and pro-
tect their dignity and privacy. Under the umbrella terms “data protection” and “priva-
cy“ - the ability to control both the circulation of PI (out-flowing information) and the 
access of others to the self (in-flowing information) [3] - a global political debate has 
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emerged. This debate centers on whether people shall be enabled to control their PI 
and which aspects companies shall be allowed to use. 
Unfortunately, the economic realities of personal data markets on one side and data 
protection efforts on the other are drifting apart. Companies capitalize on opportuni-
ties to collect and trade PI at an unprecedented scale. Uncontrolled PI trading has 
evolved [4]. Every time users surf online, an average of 56 parties track their activi-
ties on a website, largely without their consent or knowledge [5]. Companies claim 
“legitimate” business interests in the data they collect. The digital marketing associa-
tion thinks that “marketing fuels the world” [6]. Major self-regulatory efforts of the 
industry, such as the Safe Harbor Agreement and the Do-Not-Track initiatives, are 
failing [6]. As a result, almost every regulatory privacy framework in the world (EU 
data protection directive 95/46/EC, Convention 108, OECD Data Protection Guide-
lines, US Bill of Rights Proposal, and more) is now being overhauled with the goal of 
strengthening consumer rights. 
However, will regulation and self-regulation initiatives achieve what they say they 
aim for? With increasing business interest in personal information and an escalating 
conflict between privacy rights groups, regulators and industry, we believe that the 
time is ripe to develop a tenable vision of PI markets. This vision must allow for an 
innovative information-rich world while maintaining privacy. Fruitful streams of 
research and innovation depend on data about individuals. However, harm to human 
dignity and privacy must be avoided, and people must remain masters of their identi-
ties. What if we had digital markets that used and traded PI but let people control their 
information and identities?  
Because of incongruous technical, economic and legal assumptions, it seems as if 
we are far from shaping such a future. Technology scholars have developed valuable 
privacy-enhancing technologies (PETs) that could put PI management back into con-
sumers’ control [7-8]. However, their technical proposals often build on the assump-
tion that people prefer anonymity in transactions with companies [9-10]. Consumers, 
in contrast, often don’t mind being identified in transactions with business partners, 
and companies are keen to foster ‘personal’ relationships [11]. While most PET pro-
posals imply that consumers will invest time into privacy management, people simply 
expect regulators to protect them and companies to behave in an ethical way [12]. 
Finally, the PET community insists on terms such as “data minimization” [13], which 
are hardly realistic in times when users submit 95 million tweets on Twitter and send 
about 47 billion (non-spam) e-mails on an average day. The result is a patchwork of 
PET solutions that are adopted by neither industry nor governments. 
Besides the difficulties to deploy easy to use PETS, economists disagree on the ef-
fects of privacy on welfare [14]. Chicago school proponents argue that PI disclosure 
benefits society because information asymmetries are reduced [15-16]: As companies 
learn more about their customers, they can serve customer preferences better. In con-
trast, critics contend that privacy protection generates social welfare [17]. Everyone 
acknowledges that people need control over the use of their PI [18-19]. But no con-
sensus is reached yet on whether people should legally own their PI and get a property 
right [1], [19]. Many want to view privacy exclusively as a human rights issue be-
cause they are concerned that people could be ‘propertized’ [3], [20]. But giving peo-
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ple control over their PI has driven human-rights based privacy regulation so far [18]. 
As a result, only a few scholars have theorized about how PI markets could be orga-
nized with privacy [3], [19], [21-22]. Where this has been done, models fail to con-
sider the current technological landscape and legal environment. 
This article makes an attempt to fill the visionary gap we need to make privacy ef-
forts work in the economic environments we face. Based on insights about consumer 
behavior, market mechanisms, existing regulation and privacy technologies, we pro-
pose a 3-tier model for PI markets. Our model embraces information richness as the 
future of a digital economy. ‘Social data’ originating from people will inevitably be 
an important resource. We acknowledge that many transactions will be identified. 
However, the market we propose aims to empower people as much as companies. 
People and companies are assigned a few core rights and obligations resulting in a 
new and simple market structure. Many of these rights and obligations are already 
established; however, they are either weakly enforced or their importance is not rec-
ognized by policy makers. In our model, company obligations vis-à-vis consumers are 
enforced by the law and supported through privacy-enhancing technologies. The de-
sign of our model is guided by the principle of combining legal and technical enablers 
which mutually complement each other in asserting market rule enforcement. Our 
model is limited to the private commercial PI sphere, excluding government activity. 
In the next section, we describe our vision of a functioning PI market in which pri-
vacy can be preserved and consumer trust in PI handling can be re-established. In the 
subsequent sections, this hypothetical market model is described in detail, including 
the derivation of technical and legal requirements to enforce it. The paper closes with 
a critical discussion of our model’s benefits and challenges. 
2 A Three-tier Model for PI Markets 
The model builds on the existing PI ecosystem. Currently, this system is complex and 
opaque, and its players engage in many secondary data use activities that undermine 
consumer privacy and trust [4]. We create transparency and simplicity by assigning 
existing players to a simple three-tier market structure (see Figure 1). The first market 
tier, which we call ‘relationship space’, includes the business relationship between 
data subjects and 1st tier partners. The second market tier, ‘service space’, includes the 
distributed computing and service infrastructures that enable today’s business rela-
tionships. It integrates all those processors who need to receive customers’ PI to di-
rectly enable and enrich 1st tier services. We distinguish between service delivery 
providers, which are necessary to perform the principal service, and service enhance-
ment providers, which contribute to the 1st tier business relationship. The third market 
tier, ‘rich information space’ encompasses those players who do not directly support 
the 1st tier relationship. Participants in this part of the market can process as much 
data as they want, but the data they work on needs to be anonymized - to a degree that 
it cannot be linked with reasonable effort to 1st or 2nd tier transactions or data subjects. 
Each time PI is transferred to ‘rich information space’, it has to pass what we call the 
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‘anonymity frontier’. When information passes the frontier, it loses its ‘personal’ 
nature. 
The stakeholders in our model are connected by contractual relationships. For any 
given relationship, market actors are unambiguously assigned to one of the three tiers. 
Table 1 summarizes the rights (Right 1-3) and obligations (Obl. 1-9) of all actors in 
our model. Usually, the data subject and 1st tier partner agree on a contract governing 
the exchange of service, compensation and PI. 1st tier partners arrange service-level 
agreements with service delivery and enhancement providers specifying the expected 
service quality. In exchange, service delivery and enhancement providers receive 
monetary compensation, or the right to use and sell anonymized information (AI). 
Market participants in the 3rd tier close sales contracts over AI with other actors. 
 
 
Fig. 1. Three-tier model for PI markets 
2.1 The 1st Market Tier: Relationship Space 
The 1st market tier is termed a “relationship space”: visible 1st tier partners maintain 
identified one-to-one relationships with their customers. All PI they receive is the 
recognized property of their customers and can be used only for purposes set down in 
PI usage policies, which accompany every PI exchange. The 1st tier is characterized 
by identified business relationships between users and one visible company, a separa-
tion of service and information exchange and the right to a privacy-friendly service, 
legitimized information collection, people’s property rights in their personal infor-
mation and liability of the 1st tier partner for any PI abuse. The next paragraphs justify 
these characteristics from an economic and human rights perspective and point to 
their technical and legal implementation. 
 
Identified Business Relationships and a Unique, Visible 1st Tier Partner. Because 
personalized customer relationships have proved effective, companies have invested 
in CRM solutions. Companies need and want identified customer relationships [11]. 
And many customers are willing to provide their PI in the service context if they re-
ceive appropriate benefits. Therefore, we depart from traditional data protection vi-
sions that promote the idea of total anonymity vis-à-vis companies [9]. 
However, users want predictable relationships in which they can control the use of 
their PI [23]. Predictability is supported when users are dealing with only one visible 
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PI-collecting business partner. We define partner visibility as a state in which data 
subjects visiting a physical or electronically-enabled premise can unambiguously and 
effortlessly name the commercial entity that they are transacting with. Customers in a 
physical retail store such as Walldepot see Walldepot as the 1st tier partner (and not, 
for example, the shelf suppliers). 
Table 1. Actors in the three-tier model and their rights and obligations 
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1 2 3 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Role Definition Rights Obligations 
Data subject 
Natural person disclosing PI in the course of a 
service transaction in a business relationship with 
the 1st tier partner. 
x x           
1st tier partner 
Visible and primary opposite party in the service 
transaction and, from the viewpoint of the data 
subject, the party that is responsible for the PI. 
  x x x x x x  x x x 
Collector Party that gathers the PI from the data subject 
either by interrogation or observation.   (x)  x     x x x 
Controller 
„Natural or legal person, public authority, agency 
or any other body which alone or jointly with 
others determines the purposes and means of the 
processing” of PI (Art 2 Directive 95/46/EC). 
  (x)  x    x x x x 
Service 
delivery 
provider 
Entity authorized by the 1st tier partner that is 
necessary to perform the principal service. 
  (x)  x    x x x x 
Service 
enhancement 
provider 
Entity authorized by the 1st tier partner that is not 
the service delivery provider but contributes by 
sufficiently close enrichment to the relationship 
between the 1st tier partner and the data subject. 
  (x)  x    x x x x 
Market 
participant 
Any party including businesses, private persons, 
and governments who exchanges AI with other 
entities in the marketplace. 
  x         x 
 
All parties having a contractual agreement with data subjects need to be visible. Oth-
erwise, they are not allowed to collect any PI through mechanisms such as cookies or 
uploaded software daemons. If data aggregators and brokers want to collect PI from 
users, they need to establish a distinct and visible relationship with data subjects. 
The reason for this one-partner rule is that people lose control when multiple par-
ties invisibly collect their PI at the same time. This loss of control promotes distrust 
on the web [23]. From a company perspective, the one-partner rule enables companies 
to regain the monopoly on PI collection in their transactions. This increases the power 
that they get from competitive information, as unrelated data traders will not have 
access to identified information anymore. 
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Selected technical enablers: identity and claim mechanisms; graphical user inter-
face design. Legal enablers: use of standardized symbols for signaling 1st tier partner; 
mandatory ‘one-visible-partner’ rule; legal liability of 1st tier partner for PI use. 
 
Separation of Service and Information Exchange and the Right to a Privacy-
Friendly Service. Today, most online transactions are of a composite nature. Infor-
mation is collected as a service spin-off [24] without making the ‘information deal’ 
visible to the customer. In our model, companies are asked to distinguish an infor-
mation layer and a service layer within a business relationship. The service layer em-
braces the delivery of the principal service to the data subject, such as the sale and 
delivery of a book. Within the information layer, PI is split into necessary information 
for delivering a service (“minimum information”) and additional information that is 
used to enrich and enhance the service experience (“enrichment information”). Mini-
mum information can be defined as the set of PI that is necessary and sufficient to 
perform the principal service. For the online book retailer, the minimum information 
is the name, delivery address and payment information. The individual’s purchase 
history, date of birth, and affinity profile, in contrast, is what we consider enrichment 
information. Additionally, partners are obliged to offer one service option (Obl. 3) 
that requires data subjects to disclose only the minimum amount of their PI. Thus, 
people always have the right to a privacy-friendly service (Right 2). This right re-
packages the existing concept of “data minimization” [13] but limits its scope to users 
preferring data minimal over information rich services. 
Consider, for example, a web search engine, look.com, which offers three service 
options. Selected by default, the privacy-friendly option requires the individual to pay 
a subscription fee of, let’s say, € X per month; this option neither records search que-
ries of the data subject nor shows any personalized ads. In contrast, the € Y priced 
second option collects more PI and uses it for an agreed time period to provide a rich-
er service experience, such as individualized search results. The third option commer-
cially leverages users’ PI for an agreed time period, such as for the targeted placement 
of ads. This option may be free. The user trades his or her PI in exchange for the free 
search service. The ‘free’ mentality governing online business relationships today 
would make room for a more realistic view of what digital services are actually worth. 
The result of such a separation of service options would benefit all market partici-
pants: Competition in the market for PI may be improved because the salience of the 
information transaction increases [24]. In addition to service quality, marketers could 
compete on PI usage rights and privacy. They could realize new revenue streams from 
privacy-friendly service options. And people would finally get a true choice of PI 
disclosure options. 
A market challenge is that 1st tier partners could deliberately create opacity by 
providing myriad options, with variations on factors such as retention times or usage 
purposes for the PI. We therefore see the need for standardized PI usage policies that 
are adopted by regulators, at least for the privacy-friendly baseline offer (Obl. 4). 
Technical enabler: standards for the presentation of minimum PI service options. 
Legal enabler: mandatory separation of the service deal from the PI deal; obligation 
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to offer one service option with minimum information use at reasonable quality and 
price (Obl. 3); mandatory compliance with standardized privacy policies. 
 
Legitimized Information Collection and Liability. The legitimization of data col-
lection is probably the most important bridge between US American and European 
data protection frameworks [25]. Legitimization justifies the collection and use of PI. 
It can be obtained either through the active consent (Obl. 1) of a data subject or by 
legal empowerment; for example, mobile operators are legally required to preserve 
some connection data. Consent is a voluntary, timely agreement of the data subject to 
the 1st tier partner’s PI terms, which should be explicitly communicated to the data 
subject [26]. 
Reconsider the search engine example from above: The default option would be 
the privacy-friendly version of a service. At one click, customers can explicitly opt 
into the free version. Whatever service option an individual chooses, all parties han-
dling PI shall respect the agreement between data subjects and their 1st tier partners 
manifested in electronic PI usage policies (Obl. 2). Software agent solutions, such as 
P3P agents, enable people to initially configure their privacy preferences in their cli-
ents once (i.e., in the browser); for example, people might object to data processing 
for marketing purposes. A client-based architecture choice gives users more control 
over settings [27]. The user’s software agent matches PI usage preferences with com-
panies’ standard usage policies (cf. ‘Privacy Bird’ presented in [7]) and supports the 
negotiation of an agreed PI usage policy. People are empowered to actively take ad-
vantage of their legal rights in every transaction and companies benefit from better 
data quality and compliance. 
Moreover, the 1st tier partner is legally liable for any collection and use of PI. Lia-
bility safeguards the data subjects’ property right and a contractually agreed PI usage 
policy. Liability of the 1st tier partner is natural from a customer perspective. The 1st 
tier partner acts as the single point of contact for the data subject. Most importantly, 
we envision that the 1st tier partner is responsible for implementing a technical ac-
countability system that ensures that PI usage rights set down in electronic PI usage 
policies are obeyed (Obl. 5). Accountability ensures that any access, use, disclosure, 
alteration, and deletion of PI can be traced back to the party who has done so by using 
technical means. The 1st tier partner shall therefore have a technical infrastructure that 
can demonstrate PI usage rights to authorities and auditors at any time (Obl. 8). 
Technical enablers: standards for the presentation and content of PI usage policies, 
software agent-supported privacy policy negotiation, use of an accountability system 
to enable and monitor policy-compliant use of PI (e.g., sticky policies, audit logs). 
Legal enablers: 1st tier partners obtain legitimization for PI usage; handling of PI in 
accordance with electronic PI usage policies (Obl. 2); legal obligation to have and 
regularly audit an accountability system; 1st tier partner liable for all PI transactions. 
 
Property Rights to Personal Information. A core component of our model is that 
data subjects have property rights for their PI (Right 1). The property right to PI can-
not be alienated [1], [19]. Because of its personal rights character - similar to moral 
rights in copyright - seizing PI-related rights shall be prohibited. It is the characteristic 
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of identifiability that inseparably binds PI to an individual. Identifiable information 
can never be an object separable from a beholder, such as a book can be divided from 
its owner. However, usage rights to PI can be transferred. From a human rights per-
spective, data subjects have the biggest interest in the PI asset. Thus, they are the 
natural holders of this property right. 
The main reason for proposing property rights to PI is a psychological one: Prop-
erty rights would create stronger asset awareness in the minds of all stakeholders. The 
awareness that PI is an asset of economic value makes data subjects more informed 
when deciding about disclosing PI [28]. Equally, companies will probably be more 
cautious and reflective in collecting and using it. To make people aware of this asset, 
we must label information self-determination rights as “property rights”. 
Technical enabler: policy repository on the client side. Legal enabler: recognition 
of a property right to PI (for an elaborate discussion of this proposal, see [18-19]). 
2.2 The 2nd Market Tier: Service Space 
Typically, the 1st tier partner is assisted by subcontractors, outsourcers, and strategic 
alliances to deliver services and products. This complex service web adds to the inse-
curity of today’s personal information markets. In fact, consumers are most concerned 
about secondary uses of their data by invisible partners [29]. For this reason, we cre-
ate a ‘market chunk’ where this web of invisible service providers is organized. The 
2nd tier includes all companies that contribute to the services delivered in the 1st tier. 
PI abuses arise when parties at greater distance from the initial service perceive 
less responsibility for the PI they use. To extend the context-based trust between data 
subjects and 1st tier partners, 2nd tier service providers must be legally tied to the ini-
tial business relationships. This tie is created via a chain of accountability that ensures 
authorization, non-repudiation, separation, and auditability. Since all 2nd tier providers 
need to serve the 1st tier business relationship with the customer, our model ensures 
contextual integrity of PI use. PI is used within the boundaries of contextual integrity 
when the applicable social norms of appropriate PI collection and distribution are 
upheld in a given situation [30]. The following characteristics enable the 2nd tier: 
 
Tying the Service Space to 1st Tier Relationships. We distinguish between service 
delivery and service enhancement providers (see Table 1). Service delivery providers 
such as parcel services delivering book orders are necessary to perform the principal 
service. They are always immediately involved in the 1st tier relationship and, for 
instance, include entities supporting the accountability and security of transactions. 
Service enhancement providers might also need to receive PI. These providers are 
parties that directly or immediately contribute to the 1st tier business relationship. For 
instance, they provide advertisements matching the interests of book purchasers. In 
case a data subject chooses such an enhanced service option, the service delivery 
providers can also handle enrichment information and service enhancement providers 
can process minimum information. Technical enablers: privacy policy language; 
accountability system to enable and monitor policy-compliant use of PI. Legal ena-
bler: legal obligation to have and regularly audit an accountability system. 
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Authorization, Nonrepudiation, Separation and Auditability. For 2nd tier parties, 
an accountability system must comply with the requirements of authorization, nonre-
pudiation, separation, and auditability. First, authorization requires that access to PI 
by the service provider is approved by the 1st tier partner on an individual transaction 
basis (Obl. 6). When a customer purchases a book, the online shop must explicitly 
authorize a credit-scoring agency to use customer data for a credit check. Second, 
nonrepudiation prevents service providers from falsely denying that they have ac-
cessed, used, altered or deleted PI. Third, separation requires that PI units stemming 
from different service transactions, data subjects, and 1st tier partners are kept in strict 
isolation unless the legitimized purpose allows for the combination of PI (Obl. 7). 
This safeguards contextual integrity. Fourth, auditability ensures that compliance can 
be demonstrated at any time to authorities and auditors (Obl. 8). Technical enabler: 
use of an accountability system to monitor policy-compliant use of PI (e.g., sticky 
policies, audit logs). Legal enabler: separation of PI from multiple data subjects or 
1st tier partners; legal obligation to and auditing of the accountability system. 
2.3 The 3rd Market Tier: Rich Information Space 
The 3rd tier is a market space where businesses, individuals, governments, and other 
parties not contributing to an identified business relationship freely exchange and 
trade information. They, however, need to ensure anonymity according to state-of-the-
art technical standards. PI may originate from data subjects, but when the anonymity 
frontier is passed, this information becomes a freely exchangeable good. Innovation 
can be vividly spurred on the basis of this data. We assume that the marginal utility 
from identification outside of business relationships is so minimal that it does not 
justify the ensuing privacy risks. Severe sanctions should be imposed on 3rd tier mar-
ket players who distort competition by holding identifiable or re-identifiable data. 
 
Anonymity and Sanctions. Data subjects want to retain control over the distribution 
of their PI and want to share in good peace of mind. A straightforward way to create 
control and peace of mind is to legally enforce anonymity of all data except in situa-
tions where identification is needed or desired by the customer (1st and 2nd tier). Peo-
ple are granted a privacy commons, a shared space of anonymity [19]. In our model, 
this space is created by ensuring that PI cannot leave the contextual boundaries of the 
1st and 2nd tier. When it does, it must be anonymized. What constitutes sufficient 
anonymization is a dynamic concept dependent on the current state-of-the-art of tech-
nology. Regulators should document and update current standards for anonymization 
in so called “BREF”s, best available techniques reference documents, which have 
been applied successfully for integrated pollution prevention and control (IPPC, Di-
rective 2010/75/EU). Currently, the concepts of k-anonymity [10], l-diversity [31] and 
t-closeness [32] suggest that it is sufficient to have a large anonymity set of individu-
als, diverse attribute values and similar attribute value distributions. Each market 
participant in the 3rd tier is obliged to respect these anonymity mechanisms (Obl. 9) 
and is regularly audited for the fulfillment of this requirement. Finally, damages and 
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penalties for the illegal acquisition, possession, use or sale of identifiable information 
are necessary to protect a trustworthy market regime. Technical enabler: 
anonymization. Legal enabler: legal obligation and auditing of anonymity require-
ment in 3rd tier; sanctions for breaking the anonymity rule. 
 
Free Exchange. Free trade of anonymized information increases the amount of ex-
changed information. Any market participant shall have free access to the 3rd tier 
market, including data subjects who may want to sell their anonymized information 
directly. Compensating for the costs 1st tier partners incur in our model, they have the 
right to anonymize and sell any PI collected independent of the data subjects’ consent. 
Market participants can resell anonymized data once they acquire it (Right 3). Tech-
nical enabler: privacy-preserving data mining. Legal enabler: right to alienate AI. 
3 Implementing the Three-tier Model 
As has been outlined throughout Section 2, technical and legal enablers must support 
the implementation and enforcement of our model. Many of these technologies and 
legal enablers already exist. This section outlines how our model builds on these ex-
isting enablers and which need to be developed or changed. 
3.1 Technical Enablers 
Well-established privacy-enhancing and security technologies enable the enforcement 
of our model [33]. Table 2 gives an overview of selected technologies and assigns 
them to the relevant market tiers. To implement the requirement of accountability in 
the 1st and 2nd tiers, different systems based on sticky PI usage policies and audit logs 
are available [8], [34-35]. Most accountability systems suitable for ensuring contextu-
al integrity are based on cryptographic technologies that can be easily applied in dis-
tributed environments [36-37]. Determining the responsible party for a data breach 
can be achieved by available identity technology. Existing security mechanisms, such 
as SAML, can identify the 1st tier partner and the data subject [38]. To specify the 
content of PI usage policies privacy policy languages are necessary [39]. Some priva-
cy policy languages have already been standardized by the W3C consortium (P3P). 
Since negotiating these policies is a laborious and complex task for the data subject 
and 1st tier partner, architectures can make the task easier by employing software 
agents that semantically understand policy content [40]. The usability of privacy func-
tionality and user agents at the interface between human individuals and machines is 
more and more improved [7]. Although data subjects are possibly identified on the 
application layer, they might want to be anonymous to third parties on the communi-
cation layer; to ensure their anonymity, data subjects can employ existing web ano-
nymity technologies that protect the interaction between data subject and business 
partner [9]. Anonymity on the web can be supported by the “do not track” functionali-
ty that many web browsers will offer; this functionality indicates to the communica-
tion partner that no PI shall be collected. Additionally, anonymization technologies 
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are needed to realize sufficient anonymization of PI in the 3rd tier [10], [31-32]. Priva-
cy preserving data mining technologies can guarantee endured anonymity [41]. 
Table 2. Assortment of existing technologies to support enforcement in the market tiers 
Relationship Space (1st tier) Service Space (2nd tier) Rich Information Space (3rd tier) 
Accountability system 
Sticky policy, Privacy injector, Privacy-aware access con-
trol, Distributed auditing logs 
Anonymization 
k-anonymity, l-diversity, t-closeness, 
graph anonymity 
Identity mechanisms 
SAML, OAuth, OpenID 
 
Contextual integrity-compatible cryptography 
Identifier-based encryption, NOYB 
Privacy policy languages 
POL, PrimeLife policy language, E-P3P, EPAL, Rei, En-
CoRe, PERFORM, Ponder, Contextual Integrity language 
 
Privacy policy negotiation 
P3P, PISA 
 Privacy-preserving data mining 
Randomization, Perturbation, Differen-
tial privacy, KD cycle-based data min-
ing 
Web anonymity and pseudonymity agents 
LPWA, Crowds, Hordes, Onion Routing, Mixminion 
Do Not Track 
Human-computer interface 
Privacy pictograms, User pri-
vacy agent interface design,  
Visual tagging 
 
3.2 Legal Enablers 
Our model shall not only be technically feasible, but shall also be meaningful to pub-
lic policy. Policy makers need to know which of the rights and obligations we propose 
already exist in the current legal framework. One important idea is to consider PI as 
the private property of data subjects [18]. A property right to PI (Right 1) is reflected 
in the principles of informed consent (Art 7 Directive 95/46/EC, Para. 7 OECD, Art 2 
FTC Fair Information Practices (FIP)) and the right to object (Art 14 Dir. 95/46/EC). 
Missing is the recognition of full property rights to PI in civil law, however. 
So far, a data subject’s right to a privacy-friendly service (Right 2) exists only at a 
very limited scope. For example, Art 8 Directive 2002/58/EC mandates service pro-
viders to offer an option preventing the presentation of calling line identification. All 
of our model’s other obligations already exist in legal frameworks. For instance, the 
obligation of anonymizing any information exchanged in the 3rd tier (Obl. 9) already 
exists to some extent in the principle of data quality (Art 6 Directive 95/46/EC). PI 
should “be kept in a form which permits identification of data subjects for no longer 
than is necessary […]”. To this vague formula, our model adds a clear anonymity 
frontier that unambiguously determines when anonymization takes place. Best availa-
ble technique reference documents (BREF), kept current by data protection authori-
ties, prescribe state-of-the-art anonymization technologies. Thus, only minor adapta-
tions to the current legal framework are needed. 
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4 Discussion 
Our vision for a personal information market establishes compromise between players 
in the current PI ecosystem and data protection proponents. Our model embraces the 
fact that data richness is the future of a digital economy and creates room for infor-
mation-rich services and data trading as well as identified customer relationships. At 
the same time, our technical and legal suggestions empower people to participate in 
PI markets and protect their privacy. To help people understand their transactions 
with companies and the value of their PI, we create a new and simple market structure 
that assigns clear rights and obligations to all market players. Trust built by a clear 
allocation of rights also aids companies and legal enforcers. 
We are aware that many of the rights, obligations and legal and technical enablers 
we propose are not new. They have been proposed for over two decades by research-
ers in privacy, identity, security, and legal studies and debated by companies and 
regulators. We do not need new security mechanisms which can, for instance, identify 
the 1st tier partner, but build on existing technologies which have been outlined in 
Section 3.1. However, no one has demonstrated how all of the puzzle pieces could be 
arranged in a market model to benefit both people and companies. 
Personal information markets working to the benefit of people and the economy 
require that the enforcement of market rules is improved. The main design principle 
of our market model is to combine legal and technical mechanisms which mutually 
overcome its weaknesses. A legal property right to PI backed up by technical ac-
countability of data usage simplifies law enforcement access for data subjects. 
A sour apple that companies have to swallow is to finally provide people with a 
privacy-friendly default service option. But, as we show in this article, the apple isn’t 
that sour. Companies can finally re-enter competition on the basis of service qualities. 
Furthermore, our model meets the privacy preferences of different individuals: Access 
to content at potentially lower cost for those who are willing to ‘pay’ with their PI and 
alternative versions for customers that are concerned about their privacy. Privacy 
rights proponents may argue that this preference-based market structure disadvantages 
the poor, who may be forced into selling their PI. This argument is true only if mar-
keters choose to have people pay for the privacy-friendly version. Marketers could 
also make the data-rich version more attractive from a service perspective – with 
greater functionality and no ads – while offering a baseline service with non-
personalized ads in a privacy-friendly way. 
Finally, even if individuals opted into the usage of their PI in exchange for the ser-
vice, our market proposal provides privacy protection: After all, companies would be 
accountable and liable for how they use PI. Limitless reuse and repackaging out of 
context would be outlawed. Privacy risks would hence be limited even for those who 
share. As data subjects will have property rights to their PI, they will also be brought 
back to the negotiating table. Property rights, a right to privacy-friendly service op-
tions and defaults, company accountability and a transparent market structure promise 
to re-establish the trust we need to see information services flourish. 
A core benefit of our model is also its main technical challenge: the creation of a 
free market space that ensures anonymity. Ensuring anonymity becomes more diffi-
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cult as technology becomes more powerful, facilitating identification. Anonymization 
could reduce the entropy of information to such an extent that the utility for infor-
mation users would vanish. For multidimensional PI that contains many attributes 
about data subjects, the ‘curse of dimensionality’ forces that information is extensive-
ly aggregated to guarantee reasonable anonymity [41]. Utility-based privacy preserva-
tion, however, guarantees that the utility of anonymized data does not drop by more 
than a defined threshold İ NQRZQDV İ-differential privacy [42-43]. Data protection 
authorities define the “BAT” (Best Available Techniques) (Directive 2010/75/EU) 
that guarantee sufficient anonymity. Flourishing service spaces based on “non-
identified, social data” instead of “personal data” may be the result. Information buy-
ers want to obtain a representative sample of a population of individuals, not the in-
formation of identified single data subjects [41]. 
Finally, two more fundamental challenges of our model must be considered: con-
cerns of ‘monopolizing’ information and the international enforceability of our model. 
The idea that personal data could be recognized as property originated in the US; this 
idea has been met by the criticism that people shouldn’t be ‘propertized’ [3], [20] as 
well as a series of other arguments (for an overview see [19]). Ralph Waldo Emerson 
once remarked, “As long as our civilization is essentially one of property, of fences, 
of exclusiveness, it will be mocked by delusions.” For these reasons, we view the idea 
of property rights to PI critically. However, because markets already treat PI as prop-
erty, we ask only that people get the same rights that companies have already claimed 
for themselves. Moreover, a property right would not substitute, but rather enhance 
the human rights basis of privacy [18]. In Europe, it would provide people with an 
additional legal instrument, giving them easy access to existing, well-proven en-
forcement structures. Data subjects would be enabled to effectively claim their rights 
to PI on their own instead of calling on data protection authorities. 
Another challenge of our model is its international practicability. Recent years 
have shown how difficult it is to reach international consensus on data protection or 
privacy. Even more difficult is enforcement. The Safe Harbor Agreement between the 
US and Europe on data handling practices is a good example of failure. A more effec-
tive path could be to implement and enforce binding hard-law for data protection. For 
example, property rights are enforceable as well-recognized legal instruments within 
both the European and US legal orders. If Europe and the US applied property rights 
to PI [25], the rest of the world would potentially follow suit. 
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